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Abstract 
When the battlefields were within the visual range, the objective of deception 
tactics in warfare was to deceive the human senses.  In the battlefield of electromagnetic 
spectrum, the objective of deception is to deceive the sensors of the enemy weapon 
systems.  
The survivability of the aircraft operating in hostile environment is of prime 
importance to the mission planner. If the aircraft can deny its location information to the 
tracking radar of the radar guided threat missile system, this, in return, may increase its 
survivability. The deception, a tactic which stems from the wisdom of ancient battles, 
incarnated in the form of Electronic Attack (EA) can give this capability to the aircraft 
operating in a hostile environment.  Self-Protection Jammers (SPJs) mounted on aircraft 
that employ deception-repeater jamming techniques and the resulting effect of the 
deception jamming on the enemy sensor systems will be examined in this study. 
 The impact of the specific flight path and formation geometry should be 
considered both from the perspective of coherent SPJs effectiveness and the survivability. 
The individual effectiveness of the EA by SPJs is usually limited by the available 
Effective Radiated Power (ERP). Due to limitations on the size of the aircraft, one can 
not afford to build powerful SPJs. The jamming technique and the effect of multiple 
jammers with respect to jamming effectiveness need to be examined for mission planning 
xii 
 
xiii 
analysis. The specific jamming technique evaluated is the combined Range Gate Pull-Off 
(RGPO) and Velocity Gate Pull-Off (VGPO) against pulse Doppler radar. 
The challenge is to decide the least vulnerable flight path and the formation 
geometry for a strike formation in an air-to-ground engagement scenario. The degree of 
survivability provided by the combination of the formation geometry, flight path and the 
EA (multiple spatially dispersed coherent jammers) is the focus of this research. The 
modeling and simulation of the interactions between the self-protection jammer and the 
pulse Doppler tracking radar with respect to formation geometry and flight path is the 
initial objective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INCREASING COMBAT AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY THROUGH 
 COHERENT SELF-PROTECTION JAMMERS 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 “All warfare is based on deception.  When near, make it appear you are far away, 
when far away, that you are near.” 
Sun-Tzu 
  
In 2,500 years, nothing has changed with respect to warfare.  In the battlefield of 
electromagnetic spectrum, the art of deception still holds a significant place.  When the 
battlefields were within the visual range, the objective of deception tactics in warfare was 
to deceive the human senses.  In the battlefield of electromagnetic spectrum, the objective 
of deception is to deceive the sensors of the enemy weapon systems. 
 In modern conventional warfare, tracking of targets in Beyond Visual Range 
(BVR) engagements is usually accomplished with tracking radars.  The specifications of 
these tracking radars vary because they are designed to perform the tasks under various 
circumstances.    
The surface-to-air radar guided missile systems are among the most formidable 
threats to the aircraft operating in hostile environment.  These weapon systems rely on 
the target location information, which is provided by tracking radar, for the guidance of 
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its missiles [1]. Therefore, the deception of tracking radar paves the way for the success 
of avoiding the threat weapon system. 
For range tracking, the time delay between the transmission of a radar pulse and 
the returned echo signal from the target is measured continuously.  In addition to this 
time delay, the returned echo signal needs to be identified as a target as well [2].  The 
identification process for the returned echo signal is prone to deception by Electronic 
Attack (EA). 
The range tracking errors which influence range measurements arise from thermal 
noise, range glint, radial acceleration, and calibration. A detailed discussion can be found 
in [1].  
Self-protection EA systems tend to use deceptive EA techniques to break the lock 
of a tracking radar.  The preference for deceptive EA technique over noise jamming 
technique stems from the fact that there is always a potential of tracking the noise jammer 
in angle or computing the range by using triangulation techniques.  And this deficiency of 
noise jamming increases the vulnerability of the aircraft.  The high efficiency of average 
transmitted power usage also favors the choice of deceptive EA techniques to be 
employed by the self-protection EA systems [3]. 
 “Deception must never seem incongruous or illogical and should, where possible, 
accord with a pattern of events that the enemy has reason to expect” [4].  In this sense, 
the expectations of the sensor-to-be-deceived depend on its design characteristics.  For 
instance, if the sensor is a pulse Doppler radar, then the deception attack should be 
planned with respect to the specific design parameters of pulse Doppler radars.  In this 
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study the threat tracking radar is assumed to have typical design characteristics of a pulse 
Doppler radar. 
 Pulse Doppler radars generally utilize coherent transmission and reception.  This 
means each transmitted pulse and the receiver local oscillator are synchronized to a 
highly stable oscillator.  They employ coherent processing and this in return helps reject 
main-beam clutter [2]. 
 The survivability of an aircraft operating in hostile environment is of prime 
importance to the mission planner.  Survivability is defined as the “capability of a system, 
including its crew, to avoid or withstand a hostile environment without suffering an 
abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission” [5].  If the 
aircraft can deny its location information to the tracking radar, this, in return, may 
increase its survivability.  The deception, which stems from the wisdom of ancient 
battles, incarnated in the form of EA, can give this capability to the aircraft operating in a 
hostile environment.  Self-Protection Jammers (SPJs) mounted on aircraft that employ 
deception-repeater jamming techniques will be examined in this study.   
In the process of mission planning for an air-to-ground strike mission, one should 
decide the least vulnerable flight path and formation geometry of the aircraft to help 
increase the survivability of aircraft.  The impact of the specific flight path and formation 
geometry should be considered both from the perspective of SPJ effectiveness and the 
survivability.    
The effectiveness of the EA by SPJs is usually limited by the available Effective 
Radiated Power (ERP).  Due to limitations on the size of the aircraft, one can not afford 
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to build powerful SPJs.  The jamming technique and the effect of multiple jammers with 
respect to jamming effectiveness need to be examined for mission planning analysis. 
Problem Statement 
The challenge is to decide the least vulnerable flight path and the formation 
geometry for a strike formation in an air-to-ground engagement scenario.  The degree of 
survivability provided by the combination of the formation geometry (multiple spatially 
dispersed jammers), flight path and the EA is the focus of this thesis.  The modeling and 
simulation of the interactions between the self-protection jammer and the pulse Doppler 
tracking radar with respect to formation geometry and flight path is the initial objective.   
Incentive for the Study 
The emphasis on the survivability of the tactical aircraft increases for a set of 
reasons. These reasons include the fact that the average cost of a tactical aircraft increases 
due to the implementation of new and expensive technologies as a result of the 
requirements imposed by the advanced air defense threat systems. This need for an 
increased survivability for the tactical aircraft constitutes the basis on which this study is 
built. Also the fact that “operational requirements and budget constrains should require 
more cost-effectiveness out of modern EW suits and systems” [6] can be viewed as a 
supplementary incentive for this research since the research offers a solution to increase 
the EW effectiveness without increasing the overall cost. 
Chapter II presents a literature review based on open literature. Most related and 
crucial information with regard to research is provided while a general level knowledge 
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of radar is assumed to be possessed by the reader. Chapter III describes the methodology 
used for the research. Chapter IV develops detailed mathematical model for the 
coherence of jamming signals and also includes an example of a jamming simulation. 
Chapter V focuses on the simulation of the tactical formation geometry and its respective 
EA effectiveness. Results, applications of the results and the recommendation on follow 
on work are discussed in Chapter VI. 
 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
Overview 
Tactical mission planning for a strike mission is one of the most challenging tasks 
to which military pilots are exposed.  Any useful guidelines or information related to 
mission planning may be vital in decreasing the cost of the strike for the friendly forces.  
The purpose of this literature review is to explore the available information that can be 
utilized in the process of building a mathematical model which can produce data useful 
for tactical strike mission planning. 
The main conventional weapon systems that can be encountered as an air defense 
threat has a wide spectrum of variety. Although some general descriptions of these 
weapon systems can be found in open literature such as [7], [8], [9], and [1], the 
operational specifications of these systems and the tactics employed against such threats 
are typically classified. Therefore, the scope of the literature review is based on 
fundamental research methods without regard to specific radar systems or threats. 
The background information provided in this chapter starts with a discussion on 
the sensors of weapon systems and gives an overview of pulse Doppler radar.  The 
jamming technique examined in the tactical engagement modeling and the concept of 
combat survivability is also discussed. 
Sensors of the Weapon Systems 
 Early applications of electronic systems in warfare starts from the applications of 
radio direction finder to give platform position and the application of radar to detect 
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hostile platform to increase the accuracy of artillery. The latest and the most lethal 
application is to use tracking radars in missile precision guidance and this application 
leaves any undefended platform with a small probability of survival in most cases [1]. 
 The weapon employment process of any modern conflict usually starts with a 
detection phase and followed by the response phase. Detection phase for a missile system 
is conducted by a medium-range search radar (acquisition radar) and the response phase 
is conducted by the tracking radars and missile launchers. Therefore the victim sensors, 
the radar systems which are used in these phases, include search radar, tracking radar, 
missile seeker (radio-frequency seeker, infrared seeker), and electro-optic search systems 
[1]. In this study the victim sensor of interest is the tracking radar. 
Tracking Radar  
Tracking radars are assumed to be the primary threats, since they are considered 
to be associated with the terminal phases of the air defense missile systems. The primary 
mission of a tracking radar is to provide accurate information for missile guidance about 
the intended target’s range, azimuth and elevation [1]. Tracking of an airborne target is 
usually accomplished by angle trackers and range trackers that are incorporated in 
tracking radars [3].  
After the designation of target, tracking radar attempts to find and pursue the 
target in acquisition phase. In this acquisition phase, the range gate implemented by the 
radar is wider than the range gate in tracking phase [1].  
The classic tracking radar follows the path of a single target and provides the 
measurement of its position in spherical coordinates.  The position is tracked in angle and 
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range.  The range tracking is accomplished by a servo controlled early-gate/late-gate 
range tracker in the radar receiver processor [3].  This closed loop automatic tracking is 
usually called split-gate tracking.  The signal in each gate is integrated, and the difference 
between the amplitudes of the signals in each gate determines the way that the pair of the 
gates should move.  When the difference of the signals is zero, the pair of the gates are 
considered to be centered and this position of the pair of the gates gives the range to the 
target [10]. The discrimination between targets in the same angle resolution cell can be 
accomplished with narrow range gates [3]. 
The time period for the analysis of the tactical engagement in this study is the 
tracking phase after the acquisition phase. 
Radar Resolution 
Radar observations are typically defined in four coordinates: azimuth angle, 
elevation angle, time delay (range), and frequency (Doppler shift, radial velocity). A 
target is considered to be resolved by the radar if the target signal can be separated from 
other target signals at least one of these coordinates [11]. Therefore if the target signal 
can not be separated from the other signals at any of these coordinates then it will be 
processed as a single target. 
 If the radar is employing an unmodulated  pulse then the range resolution is 
simply limited with the pulse length. While the shorter unmodulated pulse will give better 
resolution, it will also decrease the energy conveyed by the pulse.  One of the ways to 
overcome this limitation is pulse compression which is utilized in many modern radars. 
With pulse compression techniques, the required range resolution can be achieved 
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without sacrificing the pulse energy. In this study the assumption is made that the threat 
tracking radar is employing an unmodulated pulse and therefore the range resolution is 
given by, 
  
 
2
cR τΔ = . (1) 
  
 
 Bandwidth of the receiving antenna Doppler filter and the antenna beam widths 
(azimuth and elevation) are the remaining factors that bound the radar resolution cell 
[11]. Therefore, with typical numbers the threat radar resolution cell boundaries can be 
defined for the modeling purposes. 
Automatic Gain Control (AGC) 
AGC is implemented in linear type receivers of tracking radars. AGC is needed 
for keeping the receiver always within its dynamic range and this is accomplished by 
compensating for the variations of target skin return power as a function of range, 
fluctuations due to target RCS and clutter [1]. Dynamic range is “the ratio, usually 
expressed in decibels, of the maximum to the minimum signal power over which a device 
can operate within some specified level of performance” [10]. 
Pulse Doppler (PD) Radar 
In PD radar, the target velocity information is utilized in various processes 
including clutter rejection and solution of weapon-guidance equations. 
In pulsed Doppler radars, velocity discrimination provides a means of selecting 
the target while rejecting clutter within an angle-range resolution cell and also 
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aids in the range tracking function by allowing the accurate prediction of future 
positions of the range gates. Generally, target velocity information is required in 
fire-control systems to solve the weapon-guidance equations.  [3] 
 
 The design characteristics incorporated into tracking radars may include 
Electronic Protection (EP) capabilities. These capabilities may include low antenna 
sidelobes to reduce noise jamming power and pulse compression techniques to provide 
the corresponding processing gain to the radar signal while denying the processing gain 
to any mismatched jamming waveform.  Detailed information on the EP capabilities of a 
typical tracking radar such as fast time constant, sensitivity time control, random PRF, 
frequency agility, moving target indicator, CFAR receiver, back-bias receiver, dicke-fix 
receiver, automatic frequency selection, sidelobe blanking, pulse compression and 
jammer strobe can be found in [1]. 
 The EP protection capability of interest to this study is the coherent process 
employed by PD which makes it matched to the target Doppler and mismatched to the 
noncoherent jamming. This EP, which may be viewed as strength, has a disadvantage that 
can be exploited by deception jammer. The coherent process requires that the radar 
radiates for a relatively long time at a constant Radio Frequency (RF) and Pulse 
Repetition Frequency (PRF). This coherent dwell at a fixed RF and PRF can be exploited 
by a SPJ that employs deception EA tactics.  These deception EA tactics are usually 
supported by digital RF memory (DRFM) that is used to emulate the coherent waveform 
[12], [1]. 
 On the other hand in pulse Doppler processing, as a protection from deception 
jammers, the range data are differentiated (which gives range rate data) and compared 
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with the Doppler generated range rate data.  This comparison allows discrimination 
against the deception jamming signals.  Also, the acceleration data extracted from 
differentiation of the Doppler derived velocity data allows the discrimination of 
deception jamming signals with unrealistic accelerations [3], and [13].  
  The DRFM technology, as a replacement to the earlier application of 
recalculating memory loop which is not a coherent method of producing memory, 
provides the capability to employ EA tactics such as Range Gate Pull-Off against 
coherent radars more effectively [12].  
Denial of the actual range rate information to the tracking radar of the threat 
system may cause an incoming radar guided missile to miss the target with a large miss 
distance where the miss distance is defined as the distance the missile detonates away 
from the SPJ. 
In PD radar, the range gate’s time position is varied by the expected Time of 
Arrival (TOA) of the pulse and the gate variation is conducted at a frequency less than 
the Doppler filter bandwidth (<1 kHz). Even though tracking of a pulse is not done in the 
conventional radar range tracking sense, the RGPO technique is equally applicable to the 
PD radar as well as conventional tracking radars [14].  
Range-Gate Pull-Off (RGPO) and Velocity-Gate Pull-Off (VGPO) 
RGPO is a deception EA technique described as below: 
The classic procedure initially employed by a deceptive SPJ against tracking radar 
is to transmit back an amplified replica of the radar waveform which captures the 
radar tracking loops. The signal then delayed in range at a rate which 
continuously increases, thus simulating a high-velocity accelerating target. At an 
appropriate time, the deceptive SPJ signal is removed, causing the tracking radar 
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to lose range track with the last measured target position and velocity grossly in 
error.  [15]  
 
RGPO will not be effective in breaking the lock of PD tracking radar by itself 
[43], because, as stated earlier, the PD tracking radar will be checking the consistency of 
the two target range rate data sets obtained by the application of two different processes.  
The Doppler shift should also be incorporated in the repeated target signal to ensure the 
consistency between the Doppler derived range rate data and the range rate data derived 
from the differentiation of the target range data [3].  
Leading edge range tracking combined with PRF jitter can also effectively deny 
any jammer attempting to employ RGPO as a deception jamming technique. But for PD 
tracking radar, implementation of PRF jitter in a pulse-to-pulse basis is not possible due 
to requirements of the Coherent Processing Interval (CPI). It is also possible for a jammer 
to implement very short delays (50 ns to 100ns) to minimize the capabilities of leading 
edge range trackers in rejecting the deceptive jamming signal pulses [3].  
 The jamming power requirement for effective RGPO can be expressed with 
regard to signal power from the actual target. Even though a Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) 
ratio of 40 dB is required for jamming the angle tracker of typical radar, a J/S ratio of 3 
dB can be adequate to employ RGPO in many cases [14]. 
 The total time for one pull-off cycle is typically 6 seconds and the pull-off 
program is generally parabolic in form. The rate of pull-off should also stay within the 
tracking capabilities of the victim radar. “Typical pull-off rates are on the order of three 
times the acceleration due to gravity (3 g), which is within the capability of most radar 
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tracking loops designed to operate against military targets” [14]. Therefore with typical 
parameters the total deception range can be found by using the formulation 21
2
r at=  
which gives 529.2 m (1.762 secμ ). 
 If the effort by the jammer is identified as an attempt at deception by the victim 
radar, then the situation for the airborne platform carrying the jammer can be worse than 
no jamming [16]. 
 The technique which includes the pseudo-Doppler shift in the repeated target 
signal to capture the tracking radar’s velocity loop is called velocity gate pull-off 
(VGPO) [1]. Combination of the VGPO and RGPO can be viewed as the half of the total 
jamming effort necessary to break lock.  This combination should be supported by 
another jamming effort aimed at breaking the angular track capability of hostile radar.  
The effect of RGPO and VGPO can be analyzed based on the ambiguity function. 
For instance, “if the target return wave and RGPO jamming are within the ambiguity 
degree plot, then the radar cannot resolve the two signals.  At this instant, RGPO is 
effective, for the radar range tracking wave gate locks on the jamming instead of the 
target” [17]. 
Combat Survivability 
Combat survivability of aircraft has always been of interest to mission planners 
throughout the history of air warfare.  The earlier belief that high performance military 
aircraft with transonic or supersonic speed were invulnerable to enemy air defenses has 
changed since the Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israel War. The Egyptian and Syrian 
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air defense systems along with the synergy of missiles and guns (missile evasion 
maneuvers put the Israel aircraft in the effective range of MANPADS and light 
antiaircraft fire) caused Israel to lose 109 aircraft (%35 of its prewar inventory) in 9 days 
of war. In response to this new form of war, technological options adapted for military 
need and standoff precision attack, standoff jamming and finally low observables 
introduced into the theater. In 1991, during the opening night of Operation Desert Storm, 
478 Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), sweep and escort aircraft used 
techniques such as jamming, drones decoys and direct anti-radar missile attack and struck 
144 targets at the cost of only one SEAD aircraft [18]. These facts confirm the impact of 
EW on the survivability. 
  One method to conceal the the approach of penetrating aircraft is to fly at very 
low altitudes to take advantage of the radar’s inability to detect targets over the horizon. 
This method requires sophisticated navigation systems that are designed to enable the 
penetrating aircraft to maintain the desired route altitude until it reaches the designated 
target [14]. In Desert Storm, coalition forces lost thirty-eight aircraft and most of them 
were shot down because they persisted to fly low-level tactics for various reasons [19].  
Therefore, it can be inferred that aircraft flying at medium or high altitude had a better 
survivability. But depending on the changing air defense environment, it is becoming less 
probable to increase the survivability of aircraft by just flying outside or above of the 
enemy airspace [20]. Therefore, it can be inferred that the exposure to threat weapon 
systems is inevitable and the need for increased survivability should be satisfied with 
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alternative approaches. The impact of the flight profile, specifically the altitude, is one of 
the considerations examined within the scope of this study. 
Another method to conceal the approach of the penetrating aircraft can be 
discussed as 
Another method pursued that still receives much attention is the reduction of the 
echo power reflected from the protected vehicle, using special design techniques 
and absorptive coatings on the vehicle’s reflecting surface; this approach is 
commonly known as the stealth technique.  [14] 
 
While this method is not within the scope of this study further discussions from the 
perspective of survivability can be found in [21]. 
 Electronic Attack (EA) is the third method to conceal the penetrating aircraft [14] 
and this study is mainly concerned about the execution of this method and its impact on 
the survivability. 
 Survivability is defined as the capability of avoiding or withstanding threats in 
the tactical arena [22].  
The survival of a military aircraft operating in a hostile environment depends 
upon many diverse factors, such as the design of the aircraft, the skill and 
experience of the crew, the armament carried, the onboard countermeasures 
equipment, the off board supporting systems, and the tactics employed.  [22] 
 
The Self Protection Jammer (SPJ) falls in the category of onboard 
countermeasures that are designed to increase the survivability of the aircraft in a hostile 
environment.   
Impact of EW and Flight Path on Survivability 
Survivability can be further described by the terms susceptibility and 
vulnerability. Susceptibility is defined as “the degree to which a system is open to 
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effective attack due to one or more inherent weakness” [22]. It can also simply be defined 
as the inability of the aircraft to avoid a hit [23]. Vulnerability is defined as the inability 
of an aircraft to perform its assigned mission due to degradation caused by the exposure 
of the aircraft to man-made threat environment [3], [22]. In other words, vulnerability is 
the inability of the aircraft to withstand a hit [23]. Therefore, in order to increase 
survivability one should reduce the susceptibility and vulnerability of the aircraft. 
Reducing the ability of the enemy systems to see or hit the aircraft of friendly forces is 
the basic procedure for reducing susceptibility [24]. Reducing susceptibility can be 
achieved by passive signature reduction and active countermeasures. While signature 
reduction delays and degrades the acquisition process of threat system it also enhances 
jammer performance by increasing the ratio of jamming to signal (J/S) [25]. Nevertheless 
this study attempts to explore the active countermeasure procedures to increase the 
survivability by reducing susceptibility. One way to implement this procedure is to use 
onboard electronic attack equipment to degrade enemy tracking and missile guidance 
systems [22]. 
Recent studies argue that instead of improving one of the factors that affect 
survivability one should attempt to increase survivability through a “layered approach” 
[20] or an “onion skin approach” [26] and [6]. These approaches aim at improving a 
combination of factors on which the survivability depends as defined previously. A 
similar approach is attempted in this study as well.  
In modern EW, the priorities of the self-protection systems can be discussed as: 
The first priority is to counter the approaching missile by increasing the missile’s 
miss distance. The second priority is to deceive or to “break” the lock of threat’s 
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target acquisition sensor or fire control radar before launch, or even after launch, 
if the missile is semi active homing. The third priority is to counter the acquisition 
phase of the threat’s fire-control radar trying to deny successful lock on.  [6] 
 
 “Modern self protection concepts for mission survivability employ the outer 
protection layers of the onion” [6] where the outer layer can be described as flight route 
selection, mission planning, intelligence, signature reduction, terrain masking, 
countermeasures and Situational Awareness (SA) which is supported by self-protection 
systems. The common objective of these techniques is to avoid detection [26]. 
 The second and the first priority concepts utilize SPJs as well as maneuvers and 
SA to avoid being hit [26] and [6].  
The focus of the study is to explore the interaction between the effectiveness of 
electronic attack and various flight paths/geometries which can be visualized as a slice 
cut vertically from the “onion” discussed above. The ultimate outcome is expected to be 
an increase in survivability with the same equipment but different flight path and/or flight 
geometry.  The effect of multiple jammers carried by the formation elements (multiple 
spatially dispersed jammers) is inspected from the perspective of coherency of the EA 
signals. Finally a survivability analysis is conducted.  
Self-Protection Jammer (SPJ)  
Self-protection jamming is an EA tactic in which the jammer is carried on the 
platform that is being tracked by the hostile radar.  SPJs are usually the EA systems that 
repeat the received threat signal to deceive enemy electronic system. SPJs can also be in 
the form of noise jammers [15].  
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In modern applications, SPJs are usually integrated with Radar Warning 
Receivers (RWR) and provide automatic threat response. The threats identified by the 
RWR are also displayed to pilot throughout the process. Power management algorithms 
are used so as to match the countermeasures to the constantly changing threat picture. It 
is possible to use separate directional jammers on different parts of the aircraft to increase 
the spatial coverage of the jamming effort [9].  
 It is an important aspect of the SPJ that it must respond to the changes in the 
threat parameters as quickly as possible. In an optimum case, the SPJ should be able to 
reprogram itself during the engagement, even though the threat parameters are changing 
quickly.  The tactical engagement scenarios examined in this study include aircraft with 
SPJ of deception-repeater type only. 
In the modeling and simulation of this work, the type of jammer to be examined is 
chosen to be deception-repeater for the following reason: 
The deception jammer is most effective (as compared to the noise jammers) 
against modern radars which employ coherent integration techniques such as the 
pulsed Doppler and pulse-compression types. This occurs because radars 
employing coherent integration techniques have a large processing gain against 
noise (e.g. on the order of 20 to 60 dB), and hence attenuate the noise jammer 
signal by that amount, while necessarily accepting any target-like return 
unattenuated.  [3] 
 
In addition, deception jammers are more conservative in terms of power while 
“noise jammers tend to use a brute-blanket effect” [27] which usually require more 
power. 
Every repeater jammer has an inherent time delay which can be described as the 
“time lapse between the reception of the radar signal by the receive antenna and the 
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radiation of transmission of the repeater output signal” [15]. This inherent time delay is 
typically 50ns to 100ns for repeater jammers [3]. This inherent delay is exploited by the 
radar designers in EP applications such as leading-edge tracking [14]. 
Tactical Formation 
 Basic two-ship formation, called an element, can be used as a building block for 
various optimization applications of tactics regarding tactical engagements because “most 
effective tactics build a division by combining two or more elements of two fighters” 
[28]. Building the campaign level engagement is usually achieved by the addition of 
formations in a hierarchical fashion based on the basic model of two-ship formation [29], 
and [30]. With a similar mindset basic two-ship formation is evaluated in the tactical 
scenarios explored in this study. 
  
  
 
 
III. Methodology 
Overview 
Asking questions is the scientific way to start a research [31]. It helps define the 
research problem [32]. Defining the research problem can also be done by observation 
conducted in a questioning attitude [33].  With the utilization of these two approaches the 
question of “How can the survivability of a tactical aircraft formation be increased?” is 
asked to define the problem of this thesis. 
Based on this question, the research hypothesis (“an imaginative preconception of 
a factual relationship” [33]) is postulated because without hypotheses, the scientific 
research becomes a mere collection of data [33]. 
Research Hypothesis 
Survivability of a tactical aircraft formation can be increased by planning a proper 
formation geometry and flight path along with the employment of coherent self-
protection jammers. 
Analysis Method 
The next scientific step is to test the hypothesis by experiment. In this case the 
experiment is the tactical engagement. Obviously setting up the actual tactical 
engagement for testing the hypothesis or observing an actual tactical engagement is not 
feasible within the scope of this research. Even though test flights can be designed for 
similar purposes it was not an option for this study. The available historical observation 
data about the actual tactical engagements in open literature are deemed inadequate in 
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technical detail. Therefore, the experiment to test the hypothesis is attempted to be 
conducted through mathematical modeling and computer simulation in a theoretical 
sense. The validation process of the models used in the experiment needs to be done as 
the follow on work to verify the results.  
 Using low cost simulations as an initial examination tool for tactical applications 
can be used effectively in many military applications [29], and [30]. This experiment 
through modeling and simulation should be viewed as a preliminary experiment which is 
designed to conserve resources. The positive results from a preliminary experiment can 
be viewed as a motivation to conduct more extensive experimentation [33].  
 The “method of difference” is utilized for developing the hypothesis. This method 
states “if an event is repeated with one factor but not another, the first factor is the 
causative agent” [33].  This method is implemented as a comparison and assessment of 
the resulting probabilities of survival of the two engagement scenarios. In the first 
scenario, SPJs are employed in a non-coherent fashion whereas in the second scenario 
they are employed in a coherent fashion. Quantitative models and simulations are used as 
part of this highly analytic research effort. 
The outcome of the analytic research is expected to be the knowledge which is 
then processed by synthesis to generate understanding [26].  Synthesis is implemented as 
interpretation of the data arrived at the end of the experiment. The test of hypothesis is 
completed based on this understanding. 
From the approach in [34] (shown in Fig. 1), the overall methodology of the 
analysis may be summarized as a study into the interaction (from the perspective of 
21 
 
22 
survivability) between the factors of Electronic Warfare (EW) and flight path and 
geometry. Using modeling and simulation, two ship formations are studied to determine 
when and how self-protection jammers may be used coherently against tracking radar.  
 
EW 
(SPJ) 
Flight Path 
& 
Formation 
Geometry  
 
Modeling & Simulation 
 
SURVIVABILITY 
 
Figure 1: Overall analysis methodology [2]. 
 
Modeling and Simulation 
In tactical engagement scenarios, the number of variables changing 
simultaneously usually presents a serious challenge for the modeling and simulation 
process. The designed model would possibly produce results only over a small part of the 
time period of interest [35]. The parameters of interest should therefore be chosen 
carefully.  The modeling and simulation methodology is utilized from the perspective of 
EW.  The resolution of the models is arranged with respect to their proposed impact on 
the EW concerns. 
 
 
IV. Coherence of the Jamming Signals 
Overview 
Power and energy concepts are widely used as a measure of the signal size, and 
these concepts are discussed thoroughly in [36] and [37]. The coherence analysis is built 
upon the concepts of power and energy. The mathematical representation of the 
instantaneous and average power, and the energy of a signal are defined as [38]  
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As discussed in [39] and [40] “coherence” is described by how the signals 
constructively add in the receiver. When the pulse signal, which is radiated from a single 
jammer source, is observed at the output of the matched filter of the threat radar receiver, 
it is assumed to be at a constant energy level. When the second jammer signal is 
introduced, depending on the degree of constructive or destructive interference between 
the received jammer signals at the threat radar receiver, the energy level at the output of 
the matched filter may be higher or lower than the single jammer case. If the output 
energy level is higher than the single jammer case then the two spatially dispersed 
jammers are called “coherent”. If the output energy level is the same as or lower than the 
single jammer case, then the two jammers are called “incoherent” [39]. 
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Further discussions on the characteristics of coherency can be found in [40]. For 
this study, the two jammer signals are considered to be of the same frequency, and the 
phase difference between the two jammer signals that arrive at the threat radar receiver is 
assumed to stem only from the Jamming Path Difference (JPD). JPD is evaluated as the 
primary cause for the Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) between the two jamming 
pulse signals.  
Deception Jamming J/S Equation Derivation 
The size of the received jamming signal and the skin return signal can be 
represented as energy signals [41]. Time average of the received signal energy is referred 
to as the received power [36]. Therefore, 
  
 ,rW Pτ=  (3) 
  
where τ is the pulse width and is the peak power (watt) and W is energy. Peak power 
and the pulse width determine the energy of the pulse transmitted [42]. Setting 
rP
1/rB τ=  
[43], Eq. 3 becomes, 
 .r
r
PW
B
=  (4) 
 
In an analogous manner jamming energy at the victim radar receiver will be given by 
 .jj
j
P
W
B
=  (5) 
 
The received power at the victim radar is given by [10] 
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where the effective area of the victim radar receiving antenna  is defined as eA
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assuming the radar is using the same antenna for transmit and receive. Then, for two way 
propagation Eq. (6) becomes 
 0.1 0.12 22 2 ( 10 )( 10 ),4 4
jLt t
r e
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R R
α jLασ
π π
− −= Γ Γ  (8) 
 
where propagation loss factors are defined as follows [44]: 
Γ : Propagation factor that takes into consideration the influence of the earth 
(underlying terrain) in the area between victim radar and the jammer. 
(propagation factor that takes into consideration the influence of the earth (sea) 
beneath the path between the jammer and the radar. 
α : Attenuation constant (dB/km) 
jL : attenuating portion of the path (km) 
For the self-protection jamming case the jamming power at the victim radar is 
 0.122 ( 10 ).4
jLj j
j e
P G
P A
Rπ
−= Γ  (9) 
 
     
Then, using Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), the J/S ratio ( ) for self protection jammer case is /jW Wr
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A polarization mismatch coefficient,γ , is also introduced to Eq. 10 since the application 
of random polarization in victim radars is a common practice [44]. Deception jamming 
waveforms mimic the skin return waveform therefore the bandwidth of the jamming 
signal is equal to the bandwidth of the skin return signal [43]. 
 .j rB B=  (11) 
Therefore, the final form of the J/S equation can be written as 
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 The J/S ratio is usually used for measuring the jammer effectiveness [45]. As the 
range, R, decreases the J/S decreases unless the ERP of the jammer is increased to 
compensate for the loss due to decreased range. The jamming power at the radar receiver 
can be increased by using multiple spatially dispersed coherent jammers. The 
mathematical development for jamming signals and the model for coherence are 
discussed next. 
Pulse Signal Model  
The pulse-Doppler (PD) radar is common, and has a simple mathematical model. 
Hence, the pulse-to-pulse analysis in this study is based on the PD radar. Various 
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mathematical models for various types of signals are discussed in the open literature [38], 
[45], [44], [46], [47], and the time-domain model of a deterministic signal is simply:  
 ( ) ( )cos( )s t a t tω θ= + , (13) 
 
where , ( )a t ω , θ  represent the pulse envelope, angular frequency and initial phase of 
the signal. In a simple radar application, the signal represented by Eq. (13) is transmitted 
by the radar toward the target aircraft, reflects, and returns back to the radar receiver [45]. 
Notional transmitted and received pulses are shown in Fig. 2 where the transmitted pulse 
has peak amplitude A, initial phase of 0 degrees, and pulse duration, or width of τ -
seconds. The received pulse is returned at time 2  where   is the one-way travel time 
to the target, and the amplitude is scaled according to the target’s radar cross section and 
space loss. 
RT RT
 
0=  θ
A 
τ
τ 2 RT  
Figure 2: Simple voltage pulse representation. 
Mathematical Models of the Jamming Signals 
For detection of a signal whose parameters are known (with the exception of the 
delay), and the noise is Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) the optimum detector 
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that can be used is a matched filter [48]. A matched filter is used in almost all radar 
receivers to maximize the output signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and its derivation and 
implementation are discussed in detail in [10], [2], [11], and [48]. In the presence of 
white noise, the matched filter in the PD receiver produces maximum SNR, enabling 
target detection within each range bin, or cell. While Doppler processing is also used in 
the PD receiver, this study emphasizes EA against range tracking circuits. When multiple 
radar returns are received in the same range bin, their MF-output will either be enhanced 
or degraded. When false target signals appear in the range cell, range tracking is more 
complicated, but the effort here is to use multiple self-protection jammers in a quasi-
coherent fashion to enhance detection of false targets from the jammers. 
The matched filter output is the cross-correlation function of the transmitted and 
the received signal when no Doppler shift exists. When Doppler shift is present it is better 
to model the matched filter using Fourier Transform methods [10], but for convenience, 
the zero-Doppler signals are passed through the matched filter implemented as the 
correlation filter [10]:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,out iny t y h t dλ λ λ
+∞
−∞
= −∫  (14) 
                                                                                       
where the matched filter input signal ( )iny t = + ,  is the received signal, 
is the receiver input noise, and assuming input SNR is large, 
( )s t ( )n t ( )s t
( )n t ( ) ( )iny t s t≈ [10]. 
Additionally,  is the matched filter’s impulse response function and is designed such 
that h t , where  corresponds to the kth range bin. Therefore, the matched 
( )h t
kt= −( ) ( )txs t− kt
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filter impulse response function of the radar receiver can be modeled with respect to Eq. 
(13) as  
 0 0( ) cos[ ( ) ] ( )k txh t A t t s t tkω θ= − − + = − −
K
. (15) 
 
In modern PD radar receivers, range tracking operates across all range bins 
making it convenient to define the phase term in Eq. (15) as  
 0 0 , 1, 2,... ,kt kθ ψ ω= − =  (16) 
  
where 2kt kτ=  representing the starting time of the kth range bin, and 0ψ  is the initial 
phase. 
 
The received skin-return and the false target signals from the target platforms are 
expressed similarly to Eqs. (13) and (16) as  
 ( ) cos( ),s ss t A t sω θ= +  (17) 
 1 1( ) cos( ),s t A t 1ω θ= +  (18) 
 2 2( ) cos( ),s t A t 2ω θ= +  (19) 
 
where sθ , 1θ  and 2θ  and are 
 0 ,s sθ θ δ= +  (20) 
                                                               1 0 1,θ θ δ= +  (21) 
 2 0 2 ,θ θ δ= +  (22) 
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and 1 1( )kt tδ ω= − , 2 2( )kt tδ ω= −  and ( )s s kt tδ ω= − . Time of Arrival (TOA) of the signal 
from the first jammer is  and the TOA of the second jammer signal is . A summary of 
the mathematical models for the signals defined so far is given in Table 1. 
1t 2t
 
Table 1: Summary of the mathematical models of the signals. 
 
SIGNAL MODEL 
Transmitted Signal 0 0( ) cos( )txs t A tω ψ= +  
Matched Filter 
Impulse Response Function 0 0( ) cos( )kh t A t tω ψ ω= − + −  
Skin Return Signal 
(Unresolved Echo for  range bin) kth 0( ) cos[ ( )]s s k ss t A t t t tkω ψ ω ω= + − + −  
Jamming Signal 
From Jammer #1 1 1 0 1( ) cos[ ( )]k ks t A t t t tω ψ ω ω= + − + −  
Jamming Signal 
From Jammer #2 2 2 0 2( ) cos[ ( )]k ks t A t t t tω ψ ω ω= + − + −  
 
Model for Coherence 
The power of the matched filter output can be compared to a threshold to 
determine when the two jamming signals achieve success. It should be noted that this 
approach is also valid for velocity-gate jamming.  
The graphical illustration of the radar range bin and the ideal received signal 
pulses are shown in Fig. 3. The convolution process is indicated by the sliding reference 
pulse. The TOAs for the skin return signal, signal from Jammer #1 and the signal from 
Jammer #2 are marked as st , and  respectively. The kth range bin starting time is 
marked . The range bin length equals pulse width 
1t 2t
kt τ  and bandwidth β  is  
 1β
τ
= . (23) 
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In the tactical flight formation, the term “Jammer #1” refers to the self-protection 
jammer mounted on the leader aircraft and “Jammer #2” refers to the self-protection 
jammer mounted on the wingman. Each self-protection jammer emits the same waveform 
with the same initial phase. This may be accomplished by using a common reference 
clock. In addition, the jamming antennas are modeled as isotropic sources, so that only 
TDOA affects the signals upon arrival at the receiver. Finally, it is assumed that the lead 
aircraft is closest in range to the tracking radar in the engagement scenarios making the 
specific order of the arrival times of the three pulse signals: 
 1 2( )k st t t t PRIτ < = ≤ ≤ ≤ . (24) 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amplitude 
 
Figure 3: Analytic representation of the input pulses, the convolution process and the range bin representation. 
Simulation of Coherence 
Based on the mathematical derivation outlined previously, the matched filter 
output for the specific range bin is simulated. Pulse width τ  is set to 1 secμ . 
t
k st t=  
t τ−  t  1t  2t  τ  
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In Figure 4a, TDOA=τ  so the jamming pulse signals from two jammers appear in 
separate, but adjacent range bins. The normalized instantaneous power and the energy 
levels [36] in each range bin are equal (ignoring a slight difference due to sampling) 
because the two jamming pulse signals are modeled as identical signals. 
In Figure 4b, the two signals overlap in range bin #1 by 53% causing the 
increased MF-output in range bin #1 while the MF-output of range bin #2 decreases. 
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Figure 4: Power and the energy analysis of the matched filter output for the specific range bin. 
 
As seen in Fig. 4, the MF-output oscillates, making the coherency oscillatory at 
best. In the general case, noise and aircraft flight dynamics make TDOA and coherency 
statistical in nature.  
Figure 5 illustrates how the energy level in the first range bin (power integrated 
over τ ) varies with respect to different TDOA values when the intermediate frequency is 
set to 10 MHz. For other frequencies, the energy level will still be bounded by the ideal 
matched filter envelope [10] making coherence probabilistic. When the two jamming 
pulse signals arrive at the exact same time, TDOA=0 and the maximum energy level is 
achieved in the range bin. Yet, as TDOA increases until TDOA≥ τ , the MF-output is 
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equivalent to a single pulse return. In other words, the desired single false target appears 
as two distinct false targets depicted in Fig. 4a. While multiple false targets may be 
tactically useful, the EA goal is to induce a strong false target in a single range bin. 
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Figure 5: Total energy levels in the kth range bin with respect to different TDOAs. 
RGPO Simulation 
An analytical simulation is given below with the typical jamming parameters 
given in [15]. In Figure 6, an A-Scope representation of PD tracking radar is simulated. 
The echo (skin return) of the aircraft formation of two ships is shown in Fig. 6a. The 
formation aircraft are separated by 110 m, and a constant radial airspeed of 300 m/s is 
chosen for both aircraft throughout the simulation. Flight path starts 80 km away from the 
tracking radar site. The pulse width (τ ) for the radar is, 1 sτ μ=  (radar range resolution is 
150 m). So the tracking radar is unable to resolve the two ship formation as seen in Fig. 
6a.  
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With the onset of the coherent jamming signals from SPJs, the AGC circuitry of 
the tracking radar is captured and the AGC level is raised during the dwell time. This is 
shown in Fig. 6b. 
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Figure 6: RGPO dwell time.  
 
After the dwell time, the deception jamming signal is delayed gradually with a 
modified exponential walk function during the total walk time.  
In Fig. 7b, the range gates are observed at the simulation time of sec and 
they are tracking the deception signal instead of the target formation. AGC level is also 
observed as slightly higher than the skin return of the target formation. This is the desired 
result out of the total coherent EA signal power at the victim radar receiver. At this 
simulation the total coherent EA signal power is 1.7 times higher than the skin return 
signal power of the formation. The coherency of the jamming signals is assumed to be 
100% so they perfectly add together.  
0.8t =
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The inevitable initial delay of the repeater delay is used as 150 nsec and total walk 
off time is 10 secμ  with a total walk time of 5 sec [15]. Both targets assumed to have 
identical nonfluctuating RCS values of 2 m 2 . 
In Fig. 7a, the target formation echo is shown as it is being tracked by the range 
gates. The initial RGPO walk is also depicted in Fig. 7b where the range gates are 
observed as tracking the jamming signal. 
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Figure 7: Initial RGPO walk.  
 
In Fig. 8, the successful RGPO is observed with snapshots from the total walk 
time. At the end of the total walk time the EA signal is turned off and a new RGPO cycle 
is initiated after a short time interval. 
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Figure 8: Snapshots from RGPO walk time. 
 
If the effort by the SPJ is identified as an attempt to deceive by the victim radar, 
then the situation for the airborne platform carrying the SPJ can be worse than if it had 
used no jamming [12]. Therefore, the parameters of jamming such as the total walk time, 
walk rate and dwell time should be planned for each threat individually. The deception 
waveform parameters should also match the reflected waveform parameters in an 
optimum fashion. 
Summary  
 The derivation of J/S equation for deception SPJ is given in the beginning of the 
chapter. Based on this equation, it is seen that the J/S ratio can be increased by increasing 
the jamming power at the victim radar. The analysis for coherence of jamming signals 
revealed that for certain intervals of TDOA, the resulting jamming power at the victim 
radar is higher than the single jammer case due to coherence. Therefore, the TDOA of the 
jamming signals need to be evaluated for different tactical formations and flight paths.  
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RGPO simulation is also illustrated as an example for the application of a typical 
jamming technique and the importance of the jamming signal power analysis. Evaluation 
of the TDOA for different tactical formations and flight profiles are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
  
 
V. Tactical Scenario  
Overview 
Because every tactical engagement has its own characteristics, it is highly 
unlikely to find a general survivability solution that can be considered valid for every 
engagement scenario [27]. For example, single stand-off jamming intentionally removes 
the jamming platform from the threat engagement zone, whereas self-protection jamming 
is based on an immediate threat to survivability [22]. Therefore the mutual aspects of the 
factors affecting survivability, which are discussed in Chapter II, should be evaluated for 
the very specific engagement of interest. For the tactical scenario where two or more 
aircraft execute the strike mission, these factors should also be evaluated with respect to 
mutual support within aircraft formation.  
The intention of this study is to explore the interactions between the tactical 
formation flight geometry and the theoretical effectiveness of coordinated on-board 
countermeasures. Subsequently this data may be useful for mission planning with the 
expectation of increased survivability of the tactical formation.  
An overall discussion about the general tactical engagement scenario from a 
single aircraft point of view and the threat avoidance tactics such as flying low and fast 
can be found in [7] while a detailed discussion especially about an engagement in target 
area is provided in [8]. However, the tactical scenario chosen for this study is of a 
specific and decisive time period to investigate survivability. Tactical consideration is 
placed on the survivability of the formation instead of a single aircraft.   
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Tactical Scenario Considerations and Assumptions 
A threat analysis process may be considered as an appropriate starting point for 
the description of a realistic tactical mission scenario. This analysis generally depends on 
intelligence data gathered by appropriate means. Open sources may also provide 
intelligence for theoretical analysis. For instance, an air defense threat capability map 
from a global perspective can be found in [20] where the different levels of expected air 
defense threat are marked with regard to different countries.  
Even though the threat weapon system in the scenario is assumed to be a fixed 
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system the overall model is designed so that it can also be 
converted to an air-to-air tactical engagement scenario. The missile guidance is assumed 
to be accomplished only by tracking radar of coherent pulsed Doppler type and the terrain 
of the engagement is considered to be plain and having no significant effect or limitation 
on the overall evaluation.  
The deception tactic can be used to degrade the state of readiness of the enemy 
weapon system [20] which then may allow to apply the so-called principle of  “the best 
defense is to avoid detection” [1]. But this perspective of deception is not evaluated and 
the weapon systems are considered to be alert and ready to fire.  
Despite the fact that “intimate intelligence database for each threat and for each 
threat-mode is required in order to generate effective techniques” [6], the threat missile 
specifications and the missile performance are not modeled but the missile is assumed to 
be using command guidance. The distinction between the different guidance systems of 
missiles is usually related to their designed missions. Medium-to-long range missiles (50-
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150 km) are designed for local area defense and tend to utilize semiactive homing or 
active homing guidance. On the other hand medium-to-long range missiles are designed 
for defending a target of great value and tend to utilize beam-riding or command 
guidance [1]. Further classifications of the missile guidance systems are discussed in [49] 
and [50] such as preset guidance and terrestrial guidance including beam rider, command 
guidance and seeker or homing guidance.  
 In command guidance, two separate tracking radars track the missile and the 
target simultaneously. The target and missile states are fed to a central computer for the 
calculation of the missile trajectory for successful interception. The calculated missile 
trajectory commands are then transmitted to the missile [2].  The victim radar for the EA 
in the engagement scenario is the coherent pulsed Doppler tracking radar that is assumed 
to be tracking the target for the missile guidance.  
When no EA is present, the rms target-to-missile miss distance of a command 
guidance missile at range R is given by [1] 
  
 2 2 ,d tgt mm slε ε= +  (25) 
  
where tgtε  is the precision of the radar that is tracking the target while mslε  is the 
precision of the radar tracking the missile. The objective of range deception jamming 
may be viewed as an attempt to increase the tgtε  value described above. Further 
discussion on the precision of target tracking can be found in [1]. 
Alternatively, it is also possible to use a single radar in command guidance 
systems. This type of guidance is called “command-to-line-of-sight” missile guidance 
40 
 
and the missile is commanded to stay within the radar beam throughout the engagement. 
More detailed information on command guidance and the calculation of miss distance in 
this type of guidance can be found in [1], [49], and [50].  
Typical airborne active and passive countermeasure systems include 
chaff/flare/decoy dispenser systems, self-protection or escort radar jammers, Directional 
Infra-Red Counter Measures and stealth, and may be integrated with a RWR or similar 
equipment for the automatic response to a threat in tactical arena [9]. The specific 
employment procedures are not the focus of this research. Hence, this study focuses on 
SPJ systems that employ deception jamming techniques, the impact of the flight 
geometry on the mutual jamming effort of the tactical strike formation and the resulting 
degree of survivability.   
While “it is not uncommon to find chaff and active EA used simultaneously in 
certain cases” [27], the study focuses on only active EA in this regard within the scope of 
the scenario described above. One disadvantage with the chaff employment is the fact 
that it may be impossible for the tactical aircraft to carry enough chaff for the complete 
duration of the mission. Therefore, if the operational information about the correct time 
to dispense chaff is not available, then the reliance on chaff may present a deficiency 
[27]. 
Aircraft Position Error 
The deterministic positions of the aircraft for any time during the flight profile are 
represented as 
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( ) ( ) ( ),
r xx t yy t zz t
r xx t yy t zz t
= + +
= + +
 (26) 
 
where the origin of the coordinate system is at the victim radar site, making 
det 2 1JPD r r= −  deterministic. However, the actual position of the aircraft may be 
slightly different than the desired position because of calibration error of the navigation 
instruments, inaccuracy in available navigation data, pilot error, instabilities in the 
atmosphere and so on. Therefore, in a rigorous way, if we assume that the maximum 
probable position error is equal for all three axes and has a Gaussian distribution with 
zero mean and variance 2pσ , then the actual position of the aircraft can be anywhere, but 
the highest probability is for position near the desired flight path. It is also reasonable to 
approximate the distribution as uniform making the position vary within a sphere and 
with equal probability. The sphere’s center is the intended position of the aircraft and the 
radius of the sphere is the maximum probable position error. This position error should 
be accounted for all the aircraft in the formation. 
 
This random position error is simulated as JPDΔ  and the actual jamming path 
difference is  
  (27) detactual JPDJPD JPD= + Δ
Note that this random position error JPDΔ  can be included in Eq. (26) for each 
axis, but is easily included as a one-dimensional variable because 1r   and 2r will change 
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with the same distribution. This approach is also easily verifiable with telemetry or 
measured position data.  
The sample space for JPDΔ  is limited to the interval [  with zero mean and 
maximum position error (as a vector magnitude). Therefore, the sample space 
for  is simply shifted as
, ]a b
b
a b= − =
acJPD tual det det[ ,JPD JPD a JPD ]Ω = + + . As stated previously, 
TDOA is assumed to result from JPD only. Therefore, it is possible to map from  
to  by scaling Eq. (27) by the speed of light, c, as 
actualJPD
acTDOA tual
 det
det
1 ( )
,
rand JPD
TDOA
TDOA JPD
c
TDOA
= + Δ
= + Δ
,
 (28) 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the sample space for TDOAΩ  when uniformly distributed, but 
this approach is suitable for Gaussian or other distributions. This sample space is used in 
the following section to compute the probability of coherence. 
 
Figure 9: Sample space (continuous) for random variable  .actualTDOA
Probability of Coherence  
Due to the assumption that aircraft position error has a uniform distribution, and 
receiver noise is a Gaussian random process [10], the resulting coherence of the jamming 
signals need to be defined as a random process. Keeping in mind the assumption that the 
detTDOA   
actualTDOA  
det
bTDOA
cdet
aTDOA
c
−  +
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jamming signal from Jammer #1 arrives at the beginning of the range bin, we define the 
event  as 
DOA
:  Both jamming signals arrive in the same range bin of interest, i.e. 
0 ≤ actualT τ≤ , and they are coherent according to the definition in Section 2.0.  In 
other words, the resulting range bin energy exceeds the threshold set for coherency. 
From the previous discussion, TDOA is a random process that can be defined by a 
probability density function, and Fig. 5 displays the conditional probability density 
function for coherency given TDOA. Therefore, the probability of coherence is [51] 
 [ ] [ | ][ ] ,
actual
P dλ λ λ
Ω
= ∫  (29) 
 
where [ | ]λ  and [ ]λ  are the probability density functions and the integration interval is 
shown in Fig. 9.  
Two-Ship Formations 
 Two-ship formation can be described as “a team of two fighters acting in concert 
against the adversary” [52]. In this formation, one of the aircraft is designated as leader 
and the second aircraft is designated as wingman. Depending on the tactics to be 
employed for the specific mission, geometry of the formation varies. In line abreast 
formation wingman flies directly abeam the leader while in trail formation wingman flies 
directly behind the leader. The basic principle of the formation is the mutual support of 
the aircraft within the formation. Further information on the formation types such as 
fighting wing, echelon, and fluid formation can be found in [52].  
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Trail Formation  
The two-ship formation flying in trail and the jamming paths of the individual 
aircraft are depicted in Fig. 10. The formation is assumed to be perfectly aligned with the 
threat radar x-axis. The altitudes and radial velocities of the two aircraft are exactly the 
same. The distance marked as  in Fig. 10 is the trail distance between the elements of 
the formation that is of importance for the mission planning process. 
dx
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
z 
dx  
  
 
 
Figure 10: Tactical Scenario Case #1. 
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Finding the Probability of Coherence  
The two-ship formation flying in trail and the jamming paths of the individual 
aircraft are depicted in Fig. 10. The  is given by the chart in Fig. 11 for various 
altitudes and trail distances, .  
detTDOA
dx
The chart shows results for the scenario where the lead aircraft is at 15 NM lateral 
distance from the threat radar. If the formation is flying at 10 000 feet with a trail distance 
of 300 feet then from Fig. 11,  equals 0.606detTDOA secμ . When the maximum probable 
position error is 100 feet then the sample space for  isactualTDOA [0.5044,0.7076]TDOAΩ = . 
With this flight path and formation geometry [P ] 0.595.=  
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Figure 11: Charts for  interval analysis for case #1. detTDOA
 
Line abreast Formation 
In this case, lead aircraft is perfectly aligned with the threat radar x-axis while the 
wingman is flying at the parallel flight path at the same altitude with same radial velocity. 
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 13 where the individual jamming paths are also shown.  
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The distance marked as in Fig. 13 is the line abreast distance that is of 
importance for mission planning.  
dy
Finding the Probability of Coherence 
The  for various altitudes and various  values are given in Fig. 12. The 
chart is drawn for the scenario where the lead aircraft is at 15 NM lateral distance from 
the threat radar. If the formation is flying at 10 000 feet with a line abreast distance of 
5000 feet, then from Fig. 12  equals 0.2768
detTDOA dy
secdetTDOA μ . When the maximum probable 
position error is 100 feet, . [0TDOAΩ = .1752,0.3784]
Similarly, this flight path and formation geometry results in . [ ] 0.635P =
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Figure 12: TDOA with respect to different line abreast distances. 
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Figure 13: Tactical scenario case #2. 
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Flight Profile Simulation and Coherence 
 Based on the examples explained in previous sections, six flight profiles with 
different parameters are evaluated. The primary design objective of the flight profile 
simulations is to evaluate the impact of the trail and line-abreast distance on the 
probability of coherence of the jamming signals. Based on the analysis of coherence, 
results are evaluated from the perspective of survivability.   
Flight Simulation 
 The flight simulation model, a six-degrees-of-freedom nonlinear aircraft model 
which is used for flight profile trials in this study, was developed by Maj. Paul A. Blue 
and Maj. Mathew W. Coldsnow at Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) [53]. The F-
16 simulation model is based on the book “Aircraft Control and Simulation”, 2nd Edition, 
by B. Stevens and F. Lewis. As mentioned in reference above, the F-16 model uses the 
data from NASA-Langley wind tunnel tests [54] on a subscale model of an F-16 airplane. 
Flight simulation is primarily designed for preliminary evaluation of flight tests.  
In the first of three profiles, the initial formation type is set as trail formation 
while line-abreast formation is used for the remaining three flight profiles. A 20-degree 
check turn is initiated by the formation during the simulation and this turn is designed to 
allow the evaluation of a third formation geometry called fighting wing formation. This 
type of formation geometry is discussed in [52]. 
Aircraft position error is simulated in three axes by the addition of Gaussian 
position error with zero mean. Maximum position error (variation) is assumed to be 25 
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feet. Fluctuations in the flight paths of individual aircraft due to position error can be seen 
in Fig. 14.  
For all six profiles evaluated below, victim radar is assumed to be operating at a 
PRF of 1000 Hz and the total simulation time is fixed at 154 seconds. These parameters 
yielded a total of 154 000 pair of pulses for the entire profile. 
Profile #1 
 In this profile, two-ship trail flight formation is used. The trail distance, dx, is set 
as 250 feet. Flight parameters for Profile #1 are given in Table 2.  
Table 2: Parameters for profile #1. 
PROFILE #1 
TRAIL 
Airspeed  
First Leg 
(1.5 min) 
Airspeed 
Second Leg 
(1 min) 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Turn Rate 
(for  
check turn) 
20°
 
Trail 
Distance 
 ‘dx’ 
(feet) 
Leader 450 K 450 K 20 000 5 deg/min  
Wingman 450 K 450K 20 000 5 deg/min 250 
 
Trail formation geometry used for the simulation is shown in Fig. 14 as a 
snapshot from the actual simulation. This visualization is taken from the beginning of the 
first leg.  
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Figure 14: A snapshot from the beginning of the actual flight profile simulation for visualization of the trail formation geometry 
[53]. 
 
The top view of the flight profile flown is given in Fig. 15. Starting position is 
chosen 25 NM away from the victim radar. Victim radar location is defined as the origin 
for the simulation. Total flight profile lasted 154 seconds. The first leg is flown for 90 
seconds followed by a 20-degree check turn which is completed in 4 seconds. The second 
leg is flown for 60 seconds. 
Both aircraft initiated the check turn at time 90t = s and the top view of the flight 
profile containing the turn is enlarged in Fig. 16 for clarification of the fighting wing 
formation in the second leg.  
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Figure 15: Top view for the complete profile #1. 
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Figure 16: Check turn flight profile top view zoomed. 
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A simulation snapshot during the turn is given in Fig. 17a and the observation 
point for this snapshot is shown in Fig. 16. Note that both aircraft initiate the turn at the 
same time which results in the fighting wing formation as shown in Fig. 17b. 
 
                                        (a)                                                                                      (b) 
Figure 17: Check turn and the trail formation changes to fighting wing formation [53]. 
 
The coherence of jamming signals for the complete profile is evaluated. Using the 
coherence model that is developed in Chapter IV, the total energy levels for the 154 000 
pair of pulses are found and shown in Fig. 18. A summary of the resulting coherence is 
given below Fig. 18. When the TDOA is greater than the range bin width, pulses arrive in 
different range bins. These pulses are referred to as “separate pulses”. In this flight 
geometry, all pair of pulses stayed within the range bin of interest; thus, the value for the 
number of separate pair of pulses is zero. Note that the total energy after the turn 
increased when the formation geometry is fighting wing. The probability of coherence is 
given by the ratio of the number of pulse pairs to the total number of pulse pairs. 
Therefore,  is found with the results given below Fig. 18. A Probability 
Density Function (PDF) is also given in   
[ ] 0.78P C =
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Figure 18-Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#1 
(Number of coherent pair of pulses= 120091, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 33909, 
Number of separate pair of pulses= 0, Number of total pair of pulses=154000). 
 
For the observation of the distribution of the total energy levels in the range bin of 
interest, probability density function for the 250 feet trail formation is given in Fig. 19. 
Note that  can be calculated for different threshold values. Energy levels in the x-
axis are normalized by the single pulse energy level of the matched filter output. 
[ ]P C
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Figure 19-Probability density function for 250 feet trail formation. 
 
Profile #2 
 In this profile, two-ship trail flight formation is used. The trail distance, dx, is set 
as 500 feet. Flight parameters for Profile #2 are given in Table 3.  
Table 3: Parameters for profile #2. 
PROFILE #2 
TRAIL 
Airspeed  
First Leg 
(1.5 min) 
Airspeed 
Second Leg 
(1 min) 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Turn Rate 
(for  
check turn) 
20°
 
Trail 
Distance 
 ‘dx’ 
(feet) 
Leader 600 K 600 K 10 000 5 deg/min  
Wingman 600 K 600K 10 000 5 deg/min 500 
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 The altitude, trail distance and the airspeed of the flight profile is changed with 
the values given in Table 3. The total time of the simulation is fixed and 154 seconds. 
The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #2 is given in  
Fig. 20. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent pair of pulses 
to total pair of pulses. Therefore, [ ] 0.32P C =  is found with the results given below Fig. 
20. Note that the total energy levels after the turn increase drastically while the 
probability of coherence is low compared to the results from profile #1. It is observed that 
an initial trail distance of 500 feet yields a higher probability of coherence than the initial 
trail distance of 250 feet after the turn. On the other hand during the first leg of the profile 
probability of coherence is significantly higher with a trail distance of 250 feet. 
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Figure 20: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#2 
(Number of coherent pair of pulses= 41866, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 41495, 
Number of separate pair of pulses=70639, Number of total pair pulses=154000). 
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The number of separate pair of pulses is not zero for profile #2. This situation can be 
observed with the evaluation of the distribution of the first 1540 pair of pulses. Fig. 21 
depicts the distribution of the energy levels for the first 1540 pair of pulses for profile #2. 
Note that this trail distance of 500 feet results 1136 separate pair of pulses out of 1540 
pair of pulses during the first leg. When the pulses arrive with a TDOA greater than range 
bin width, energy level in the range bin of interest reflect the normalized energy level of 
1 because only one jamming signal results in the range bin of interest. The second pulse 
arrives in adjacent range bins depending on the value of TDOA. This situation is also 
depicted in Fig. 4a where two separate pulses are observed in two different range bins 
due to the value of TDOA. 
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Figure 21: Distribution of the total energy levels in the range bin of interest for profile #2.  
(Number of coherent Pulses= 307, Number of Non coherent Pulses= 97, Number of Total 
Pulses=1540, Number of Separate Pulses=1136). 
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PDF for the profile #2 is given in Fig. 22 for the observation of the overall 
distribution of the pulses and the respective probability. Similarly it is possible to 
evaluate different threshold values for coherence based on the respective probabilities 
given in Fig. 22. Energy levels in the x-axis are normalized by the single pulse energy 
level of the matched filter output. 
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Figure 22- Probability density function for 500 feet trail formation. 
 
Profile #3 
This profile is also flown by a two-ship trail flight formation. The trail distance, 
dx, is set as 750 feet. Flight parameters for profile #3 are given in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Parameters for profile #3. 
PROFILE #3 
TRAIL 
Airspeed  
First Leg 
(1.5 min) 
Airspeed 
Second Leg 
(1 min) 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Turn Rate 
(for  
check turn) 
20°
 
Trail 
Distance 
 ‘dx’ 
(feet) 
Leader 450 K 450 K 20 000 5 deg/min  
Wingman 450 K 450K 20 000 5 deg/min 750 
 
The altitude, trail distance and the airspeed of the flight profile is changed with 
the values given in Table 4. The total time of the simulation is fixed and 154 seconds. 
The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #3 is given in  
Fig. 23. As seen in the Fig. 23, total energy level in the range bin of interest is reflecting 
only single jamming pulse because of the trail distance jamming pulses arrive in different 
range bins. Therefore  is found.     [ ] 0P C =
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Figure 23: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#3 
(Number of coherent pair of pulses= 0, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 0, Number of 
seperate pair of pulses=154000, Number of total pair of pulses=154000). 
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Profile #4 
In this profile, two-ship line-abreast flight formation is used. The line-abreast 
distance, dy, is set as 4000 feet. Flight parameters for profile #4 are given in Table 5.  
Table 5: Parameters for profile #4. 
PROFILE #4 
LINEABREAST 
Airspeed  
First Leg 
(1.5 min) 
Airspeed 
Second Leg 
(1 min) 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Turn Rate 
(for  
check turn) 
20°
 
Line abreast 
Distance 
 ‘dy’ 
(feet) 
Leader 600 K 600 K 10 000 5 deg/min  
Wingman 600K 600K 10 000 5 deg/min 4000 
 
Line-abreast formation geometry used for the simulation is shown in Fig. 24 as a 
snapshot from the actual simulation. This visualization is from the beginning of the first 
leg.  
 
Figure 24: A snapshot from the beginning of the actual flight profile simulation for visualization of the line abreast formation 
geometry [53]. 
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The top view of the flight profile flown is given in Fig. 25. Similar to trail 
formation profiles, starting position for the leader aircraft is chosen 25 NM away from 
the victim radar. Victim radar location is defined as the origin for the simulation. Total 
flight profile is lasted for 154 seconds. First leg is flown for 90 seconds followed by a 
 check turn which is completed in 4 seconds. Second leg is flown for 60 seconds. 20°
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Figure 25: Top view for the complete profile #4. 
 
Both aircraft initiated the check turn at time 90t = s and this resulted in a line-
abreast formation geometry where the wingman is in a relatively forward position 
compared to initial line-abreast position in the first leg. Fig. 26a is snapshot visualization 
from the actual simulation showing the simultaneous initiation of the check turn by both 
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aircraft. The resulting formation geometry described above can be observed in Fig. 26b. 
The airspeed of the wingman and the leader kept equal and constant as given in Table 5. 
 
                                        (a)                                                                                      (b) 
Figure 26: Check turn and the line-abreast formation is distorted from the initial setup parameters [53]. 
 
Similarly, the coherence of jamming signals for the complete profile is evaluated. 
Using the coherence model that is developed in Chapter IV, the total energy levels for the 
154 000 pair of pulses are found and shown in Fig. 27. A summary of the resulting 
coherence is given below Fig. 27. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of 
the coherent pair of pulses to total pair of pulses. Therefore [ ] 0.40P C =  is found with the 
results given below Fig. 27. This probability of coherence is calculated for the entire 
profile.  
However it must be noted from Fig. 27 that the pair of pulses arrive in separate 
range bins mostly after the turn. For the specific time interval the probability of 
coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent pair of pulses to total pair of pulses. This 
implies that the overall probability of coherence for the entire flight path can be 
misleading in many cases. 
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Figure 27: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#4 
(Number of coherent pair pulses= 61214, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 36944,    Number of 
separate pair of pulses=55842, Number of total pair of pulses=154000). 
 
Probability density function for profile #4 is given in Fig. 28. Note that  can 
be calculated for different threshold values because any energy level can be set as a 
threshold for coherence and the respective probability for coherence can be evaluated 
from Fig. 28. Energy levels in the x-axis are normalized by the single pulse energy level 
of the matched filter output. 
[ ]P C
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Figure 28: Probability density function for 4000 feet line abreast formation. 
 
Profile #5 
In this profile is also flown as a two-ship line-abreast flight formation. The line-
abreast distance, dy, is set as 5000 feet. Flight parameters for Profile #5 are given in 
Table 6. Note that in this profile, the airspeed for the wingman is decreased by 30 K in 
the second leg with an attempt to preserve initial formation geometry after the turn. 
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Table 6: Parameters for Profile #5. 
PROFILE #5 
LINEABREAST 
Airspeed  
First Leg 
(1.5 min) 
Airspeed 
Second Leg 
(1 min) 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Turn Rate 
(for  
check turn) 
20°
 
Line abreast 
Distance 
 ‘dy’ 
(feet) 
Leader 500 K 500K 15 000 5 deg/min  
Wingman 500K 470K 15 000 5 deg/min 5000 
 
The altitude, line-abreast distance and the airspeed of the flight profile is changed 
with the values given in Table 6. The total time of the simulation is fixed and 154 
seconds. The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #5 
are given in Fig. 29. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent 
pair of pulses to total pair of pulses. Therefore, for the duration of the entire profile, 
 is found with the results given below Fig. 29.  [ ] 0.43P C =
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Time [sec]
E
ne
rg
y 
Le
ve
l 
In
 R
an
ge
 B
in
 
Figure 29: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#4 
(Number of coherent pair pulses= 66188, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 32053, Number of 
separate pair of pulses=55759, Number of total pair of pulses=154000). 
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Probability density function for profile #5 is given in Fig. 30. Similarly different 
energy levels can be set as a threshold for coherence and the respective probability for 
coherence can be evaluated for this profile as well. 
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Figure 30: Probability density function for 5000 feet line abreast formation. 
 
Profile #6 
This profile is also flown as a two-ship line abreast flight formation. The line 
abreast distance, dy, is set as 6000 feet. Flight parameters for profile #6 are given in 
Table 7. Note that in this profile, similar to the profile #5, the airspeed for the wingman is 
decreased by 30 K in the second leg with an attempt to preserve initial formation 
geometry after the turn. 
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 Table 7: Parameters for profile #6. 
PROFILE #6 
LINEABREAST 
Airspeed  
First Leg 
(1.5 min) 
Airspeed 
Second Leg 
(1 min) 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Turn Rate 
(for  
check turn) 
20°
 
Line abreast 
Distance 
 ‘dy’ 
(feet) 
Leader 450 K 450K 10 000 5 deg/min  
Wingman 450K 420K 10 000 5 deg/min 6000 
 
The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #6 are 
given in Fig. 31. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent pair of 
pulses to total pair of pulses. Therefore, for the duration of the entire profile,  
is found with the results given below Fig. 31. 
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Figure 31: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#6 
(Number of coherent pair pulses= 58674, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 38938, Number of 
separate pair of pulses=56388, Number of total pair of pulses=154000). 
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Probability density function for profile #5 is given in Fig. 32. Similarly different 
energy levels can be set as a threshold for coherence and the respective probability for 
coherence can be evaluated for this profile as well. 
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Figure 32: Probability density function for 6000 feet lineabreast formation. 
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VI. Results  
Result 1 
 Impact of flight path and formation geometry on the coherence of jamming 
signals is verified through modeling and simulation. Different probability of coherence 
values are found for different flight paths and formation geometries. This outcome 
verified the existence of an interactive relationship between flight path and formation 
geometry and the EW effectiveness.  
Result 2 
 Evaluation of the nature of this interactive relationship in six different flight 
profiles revealed that specific flight paths and formation geometries can be designed 
during the mission planning processes to enhance the jamming effectiveness. The nature 
of the results arrived in Chapter V dictates that the formation geometry should be 
designed for the specific time period of the flight profile. Because it is observed that the 
overall probability of coherence for the entire flight profile may be misleading. For 
instance, a line abreast formation yielded higher probability of coherence in the initial leg 
of the flight profile while a fighting wing formation yielded higher probability of 
coherence in the second leg of the flight profile. 
Result 3 
 The location of the victim radar is verified to be the vital input in deciding the 
instantaneous formation geometry of the tactical formation during the engagement. With 
this information available, mission planning processes may produce proper formation 
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geometry and flight path to increase the survivability. This result implies that the 
hypothesis postulated in the beginning of the research is valid provided that the all vital 
inputs are present during the mission planning. Applications of the results are further 
discussed from the perspective of survivability in the next section. 
Application of the Results  
The results imply that the quasi-coherent effects caused by two self-protection 
jammers can create stronger false targets in the radar receiver. Hence, the false target can 
degrade the threat radar’s capability to track and launch threat missiles at the aircraft 
increasing aircraft survivability. The next stage of this work is to develop a model for 
probability of survival based on probability of coherence. The analysis of the engagement 
level survivability can be visualized as a tree diagram shown in Fig. 32. Similar 
methodology for “mission level survivability” can be found in [22].  
In order for the threat weapon system to kill the aircraft at the end of the 
engagement, the flow of the events  and  must follow the solid arrows on the right. 
Probability of Survival, , is the complement of the Probability of Kill, SP KP , and two 
events have mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes [22]. It should be noted that 
Fig. 32 is drawn for “non-coherent EA”. When the same analysis is carried out for the 
engagement where “coherent EA” is implemented (assuming that all other factors remain 
constant) the resulting new probability of kill may be expressed in terms of the original 
KP  as 
 'K KP Pα=  (30) 
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where . Therefore, the probability of survival for coherent EA is [ | ] [ ]KP P P=
S KP P
' 1 α= − . 
The scaling factor α reflects the impact of coherent EA on the survivability. It is 
then possible to decide the increase in survivability of a strike formation through coherent 
self-protection jammers. 
 
 
Threat radar detects the formation, starts to 
track and launch a missile despite NON-
Coherent Jamming  
 
Figure 32: Probability of survival tree diagram. 
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VII. Conclusions and Future Work 
Conclusion 
 This preliminary experiment revealed that it is possible to measure the impact of 
coherent jamming on combat aircraft survivability through the method of difference. The 
evaluation of basic tactical formation geometries and flight paths from the perspective of 
jamming effectiveness proved that proper mission planning may increase the total 
survivability. These positive results can be viewed as a motivation to conduct more 
extensive research with a high fidelity tracking radar model and a flight simulation which 
includes an atmospheric model.   
Future Work 
 The application of interconnection of the coherent SPJ jammers via a data link to 
exchange processed data may be explored from the perspective of sensor fusion 
techniques. The advantages of sensor fusion applications such as the datalink between the 
airborne radars of tactical aircraft are briefly discussed in [1]. Cooperative tactical 
operations that use a data link can be organized into three categories: situation awareness 
(threat tracking, system status), offensive operations (attack planning, missile handoff), 
defensive operations (EW, missile warning) [55]. This study can be further evaluated in 
all three categories mentioned above. The future research may also shift its tactical 
perspective from manned aircraft to Unmanned Combat Aircraft Vehicle (UCAV) and 
respective sensor fusion application opportunities as well. 
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